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sentations. The common law of representations remains relatively un-
changed. Materiality of representations has always been a prerequisite
for cancellation of a policy of insurance or for prevention of recovery
by the insured. Fraudulent, but immaterial, representations have never
been considered by the common law, or under modem statutes, as war-
ranting an avoidance of a policy of insurance. Further relaxation of
the common law, then, must come in the standard selected and applied
by the court for determining the materiality of the incorrect statement
being contested. The "written question-written pmswer" doctrine cer-
tainly will do nothing toward furthering the purpose of the statute and
it is hoped that this proposition will not again be heard, but that the
North Carolina Supreme Court will in the future adopt some form of
objective standard.
JOSEPH C. MooRE, JR.
Judgments-Opening Default Judgment for Neglect of Attorney-
Discretionary Power in Trial Judge
The plaintiff sued in claim and delivery for the recovery of an auto-
mobile and had judgment by default for want of an answer. When
execution issued defendant appeared and moved that the judgment be
set aside for excusable neglect. The clerk allowed the motion and the
plaintiff appealed to the judge of the superior court who affirmed the
order vacating the judgment upon the following findings of fact: sum-
mons was duly served on defendant together with an order extending
the time to file complaint (G. S. §1-121) whereupon she employed an
attorney who mistakenly advised her that the plaintiff could not pro-
ceed until additional papers were served on her, and that he would
request the clerk to notify him of the filing of the complaint, and
would inform her when it became necessary for her to answer; the
attorney then became seriously ill and was unable to attend to the duties
of his office, as a result of which no further action was taken and the
default judgment was entered; the defendant was unacquainted with
court procedure and had not herself been negligent; she had a meri-
torious defense to the cause as an innocent purchaser for value. The
Superior Court ruled, therefore, that the default was occasioned by the
negligence of the attorney and that the same was not imputable to the
defendant who was without fault. The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme
Court. Held- order vacating the judgment affirmed.' Since the failure
to answer was not wholly due to the attorney's erroneous belief that
additional papers2 would have to be served on the defendant, the major-
'Rierson v. York, 227 N. C. 575, 42 S. E. 2d 902 (1947).The complaint. Record, p. 22.
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ity ruled that the judge in the exercise of a sound discretion was author-
ized to set the judgment aside.s
The statute under which relief from the judgment was allowed reads
in part as follows: "The judge shall upon such terms as may be, just,
at any time within one year after notice thereof, relieve a party from a
judgment, order, verdict or other proceeding taken against him through
his mistake, inadvertance, surprise or excusable neglect. .... 4
In its application, North Carolina at an early date recognized a dis-
tinction between the negligence of the litigant and that of his attorney,
and ruled that the negligence of the latter, whether excusable or not,
would not be imputed to the former so as to bar relief.r" The movant's
attorney, however, must be one licensed to practice in this state,6 and
his negligence on which the prayer for relief is predicated must have
been some failure in the performance of professional duties7 which
occurred prior to and was the cause" of the judgment sought to be
vacated. And the movant himself must be without fault.
9
The rule of non-imputation is a departure from the general doctrine
of agency which holds the principal responsible for the acts of his agent,
and represents the minority'0 rule in the construction of statutes sub-
stantially the same as that above,"' the majority holding that negligence
of an attorney is ground for setting a judgment aside only when ex-
cusable.' 2  In view of its general acceptance, it would seem that little
Chief Justice Stacy dissented without opinion.
'N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-220.
Griel v. Vernon, 65 N. C. 76 (1871) (attorney's neglect to file a plea is a
surprise on the client whose failure to examine the record to ascertain that it had
been filed, is an excusable neglect) ; Meece v. Commercial Credit Co., 201 N. C.
139, 159 S. E. 17 (1931); Helderman v. Hartsell Mills Co., 192 N. C. 626, 135
S. E. 627 (1926); Grandy v. Carolina Products Co., 175 N. C. 511, 95 S. E. 914
(1918) ; Schiele v. North State Fire Ins. Co., 171 N. C. 426, 88 S. E. -764 (1916).
'Manning v. Roanoke & T. R. R., 122 N. C. 824, 28 S. E. 936 (1898); see
Harrell v. Welstead et al., 206 N. C. 817, 820, 175 S. E. 283, 286 (1934).7 Manning v. Roanoke & T. R. R., 122 N. C. 824, 28 S. E. 936 (1898) ; Seawell
v. Parsons Lumber Co., 172 N. C. 320, 90 S. E. 241 (1916) (in the performance
of non-professional acts the attorney is an ordinary agent whose negligence is
attributable to his principal).
'Dail v. Hawkins, 211 N. C. 283, 189 S. E. 774 (1937) (by implicatioh);
.Lumber Co. v. Cottingham, 173 N. C. 323, 327, 92 S. E. 9; !1 (1917) ("Excusable
negligence is something which must have occurred at or before the entry of the
judgment, and which caused it to be entered, not matter ex post facto which had
no relation to the action of the court or to anything which transpired before its
rendition;") ; see Bradford v. Coit, 77 N. C. 72, 75 (1877).
'Kerr v. North Carolina Joint Stock Land Bank, 205 N. C. 410, 171 S. E.
367 (1933) ; Abbitt v. Gregory, 195 N. C. 203; 141 S. E. 587 (1928) ; Helderman
v. Hartsell Mills Co., 192 N. C. 626, 135 S. E. 627 (1926) ; Taylor v. Pope, 106
N. C. 267, 11 S. E. 257 (1890) ; Griel v. Vernon, 65 N. C. 76 (1871) ; see Cahoon
v. Brinkley, 176 N. C. 5, 9, 96 S. E. 650, 652 (1918).
"
0Accord, Sullivan v. Sullivan, 266 Mass. 228, 165 N. E. 89 (1929); Jensen
v. Backman et al., 246 App. Div. 741, 283 N. Y. Supp. 862 (2d Dep't 1935).
"
1E.g., CAL. CODE. CIV. PROC. (Deering, 1941) §473; MoxT. REv. CoDEs
(Anderson & McFarland, 1935) §9187; N. D. Rxv. CODE (1943) §28-2901; S. C.
CODE (1942) §495; Wis. STAT. (1941) §269.46.
", Stub v. Harrison, 35 Cal. App. 2d 685, 96 P. 2d 979 (- Dep't 1939);
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need be said in support of the validity of the majority rule. For the
minority, the rationale of the rule against imputation of the attorney's
neglect is well stated in Schiele v. North State Fire Ins. Co.
"And why is not this the wise and just rule and in accord-
ance with the letter and spirit of the statute? The attorney is an
officer of the court, and acts under its direction and control, and
the client employs him because of his learning and skill, to do
something he cannot do for himself, and his fitness for the duty
is certified to by the courts who have licensed him. If so, and
the client has been guilty of no neglect, and a valuable right has
been lost by the failure of the attorney to file an answer, why
should he not be relieved under a statute... which gives author-
ity to the court to relieve a 'party' on account of 'his' surprise,
etc. .... ,11
In 1921, the legislature of Idaho amended 14 a statute'5 substantially
similar to G. S. 1-220 to require' the trial judge to set aside a judgment
occasioned by the negligent failure of an attorney to file or serve any
paper in the cause as to which his client was without fault, and to enable
the judge in his discretion to require the attorney to pay the costs or
actual expenses of the successful party in the judgment to be set aside
and a fine of not more than one hundred dollars. This provision allevi-
ates an undue hardship on the successful party and avoids penalizing
the unsuccessful party by placing the hardship where it belongs, i.e., on
the attorney lacking a sufficient excuse for his delinquency. It is sub-
mitted that adoption of this amendment would promote certainty in the
law as applied to motions for relief on the ground of counsel's negli-
gence, and would make the rule of non-imputation a great deal more
just.
The standard of care required of the litigant in every case is that
which a man of ordinary prudence usually bestows on his important
business. 17  He must show that he has been active and diligent,' 8 and
Romero v. Snyder, 167 Cal. 216, 138 Pac. 1002 (1914) ; Rieckhoff v. Woodhull, 106
Mont. 22, 75 P. 2d 56 (1937); Smith v. Wordeman, 59 S. D. 368, 240 N. W. 325
(1932); Haskins-v. Haskins' Estate, 113 Vt. 466, 35 A. 2d 662 (1944); see 15,
R. C. L. §161; Notes, 34 HARv. L. Rav. 559 (1921); 9 N. C. L. Rav. 91 (1930).13171 N. C. 426, 432, 88 S. E. 764, 767 (1916).
x' Idaho Sess. Laws 1921, c. 235, §1.
1 IDAHO LAws ANN. (1943) §5-905.
1" Wagner v. Mower, 41 Idaho, 380, 237 Pac. 118 (1925) (if the judgment was
occasioned by the attorney's negligence, the judge has no discretion but.must set
it aside).
" Whitaker v. Raines, 226 N. C. 526, 39 S. E. 2d.266 (1946); Johnson v. Sid-
bury, 225 N. C. 208, 34 S. E. 2d 67 (1945) ; Jones-Onslow Land Co. v. Wooten,
177 N. C. 248, 98 S. E. 706 (1919) ; Pierce v. Eller, 167 N. C. 672, 83 S. E. 758(1914) ; Roberts v. Allman, 106 N. C. 391, 11 S. E. 425 (1890) ; Sluder v. Rol-
lins, 76 N. C. 271 (1877); Elms v. Elms, 72 Cal. App. 2d 508, 164 P. 2d 936(1946) ("If judgment be entered against a party in his absence before he can be
relieved therefrom he must show that it was the result of a mistake or inad-
vertance which reasonable care could" not have avoided, a surprise which reason-
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he must have employed counsel.19 It has been held, however, that mere
employment of counsel is not enough,20 that the litigant may not abandon
his case on the employment of counsel, 21 and that when- he has a case
in court, he must attend to it.2 2  These principles have served as the
basis for decision in a number of cases23 wherein the net result was
to impute the causative negligence of the attorney to his client, on the
theory that the latter had not lived up to these requirements. In other
cases, indistinguishable on the facts reported,2 4 the litigant was held not
negligent and the rule of non-imputation applied to permit vacating the
judgment. In the instant case, defendant employed an attorney and
thereafter did nothing more than .make a single telephone inquiry25
(some thirty days before the default judgment was rendered), regard-
ing the progress of the case. On the basis of previous ruling involving
the question of vacating default judgments the court could have found
precedent for either granting or denying the relief.2 6 The allowance of
relief in this case is in line with the liberal view evidenced in more
recent decisions.27
It is true that in the case under consideration the dtefendant's attor-
ney erred when he advised his client that the complaint would have to
be served on her before the plaintiff could proceed to judgment.2 8
Plaintiff's counsel therefore contended on appeal that the defendant was
able precaution could not have prevented, or a neglect which reasonable prudence
could not have anticipated.").
" Carter v. Anderson, 208 N. C. 529, 181 S. E. 750 (1935) ; Gaster v. Thomas,
188 N. C. 346, 124 S. E. 609 (1924) ; Pierce v. Eller, 167 N. C. 672, 83 S. E. 758(1914).
"9 Holland v. Benevolent Assn., 176 N. C. 86, 97 S. E. 150 (1918); Churchill
v. Brooklyn Life Ins. Co., 88 N. C. 205 (1883) ; see Sutherland v. McLean, 199
N. C. 345, 347, 154 S. E. 662, 663 (1930).
" E.g, Hyde County Lumber Co. v. Thomasville Chair Co., 190 N. C. 437,
130 S. E. 12 (1925).
'" E.g., Roberts v. Allman, 106 N. C. 391, 11 S. E. 425 (1890).
,'E.g., Pepper v. Clegg, 132 N. C. 312, 43 S. E. 906 (1903).
" Hyde County Lumber Co. v. Thomasville Chair Co., 190 N. C. 437, 130 S. E.
12 (1925) ; Hardware Co. v. Buhmann et al., 159 N. C. 511, 75 S. E. 731 (1912) ;
Reynolds v. Greensboro Boiler & Machine Co., 153 N. C. 342, 69 S. E. 248 (1910).
2 Gunter v. Dowdy, 224 N. C. 522, 31 S. E. 2d 524 (1944); Meece v. Com-
mercial Credit Co., 201 N. C. 138, 159 S. E. 17 (1931); Helderman v. Hartsell
Mills Co., 192 N. C. 626, 135 S. E. 627 (1926); Gwathney v. Savage, 101 N. C.
103, 7 S. E. 661 (1888) ; English v. English, 87 N. C. 497 (1882).
" Record, p. 22.
28 Compare cases cited note 23 supra with those cited note 24 supra.
27 See Craver v. Spaugh, 226 N. C. 450, 451, 38 S. E. 2d 525, 527 (1946);
Gunter v. Dowdy, 224 N. C. 522, 31 S. E. 2d 524 (1944) ; Gosnell v. Hilliard, 205
N. C. 297, 171 S. E. 52 (1933) ; Meece v. Commercial Credit Co., 201 N. C. 139,
159 S. E. 17 (1931) ; Sutherland v. McLean, 199 N. C. 345, 154 S. E. 662 (1930).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-121 (where the plaintiff is given additional
time in which to file complaint, the statute provides that a copy of such order be
served with the summons; plaintiff is required to prepare a copy of the complaint
for the use of defendant and his attorney, but it is then filed with the clerk rather
than being served on defehdant).
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barred from relief, for a mistake of law whether made by the litigant"
or by his attorney3" does not constitute ground for setting a judgment
aside. North Carolina holds with the majority3 l that the statute has
reference to mistakes of fact 32 and not of law. But since defendant's
attorney promised to secure a copy of the complaint when filed, 3 and
presumably would have done so had it not been for his illness, there
seemed to be no real reliance on his misapprehension of the law either
by himself or by the defendant. The question of the right of a
litigant to have a judgment set aside on the ground of a mistake of law
made by his attorney was thus not squarely before the court and there-
fore not decided.3 4
The court in the instant case ruled that motions under the statute
to vacate judgments are addressed to the sound legal discretion of the
trial court, whose ruling thereon can be reviewed only for an abuse of
discretion.3 5 As a general proposition, this agrees with the cases in our
own reports3 6 and those of other jurisdictions.37 But it must be remem-
bered that the existence of a discretionary power depends on whether
the negligence which occasioned the judgment complained of is ex-
29Lerch Bros. v. IcKinne Bros., 187 N. C. 419, 122 S. E. 9 (1924) ; Skinner
v. Terry, 107 N. C. 103, 12 S. E. 118 (1890).
"0 Phifer v. Ins. Co., 123 N. C. 405, 31 S. E. 715 (1898).
" Kingsbury v. Brown, 60 Idaho 464, 92 P. 2d 1053 (1939); Rieckhoff v.
Woodhull, 106 Mont. 22, 75 P. 2d 56 (1937) ; Lucas v. North Carolina Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 184 S. C. 119, 191 S. E. 711 (1937) ; cf. Savage v. Cannon, 204 S. C. 473,
30 S. E. 2d 70 (1944) (where defendant's attorney was mistaken as to the time
allowed for answering, order vacating the default judgment was affirmed). Plano
Manufacturing Co. v. Murphy, 16 S. D. 380, 92 N. W. 1072 (1902); see Note,
153 A. L. R. 449,. 455 (1944); 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS §238 (5th ed., Tuttle,
1925).
82 1 FREMAN, op. cit. supra, note 31, §241 ("Where the statute enumerates ex-
cusable neglect as one of the grounds for vacating a judgment, it seems superfluous
to name any other; for such other grounds as have been named, to wit, mistake,
surprise, inadvertance, unavoidable casualty or misfortune, if they or any of them
exist under circumstances such as erititle the moving party to relief constitute a
case of excusable neglect.") ; see Marsh v. Griffin, 123 N. C. 660, 667, 31 S. E.
840, 842 (1898) for a similar observation. But cf. Mann v. Hall, 163 N. C. 50, 79
S. E. 437 (1913) (relief on the ground of a mistake of fact allowed without con-
sideration of the question of fault in making the mistake, the court holding that
the several gronds for relief specified in the statute are separable and not "mere
surplusage").
8 Record, p. 22.
" Rierson v. York, 227 N. C. 575, 578, 42 S. E. 2d 902, 903 (1947) ("There
was evidence from which the judge might find, and did find, that the neglect was
due to the incapacity of the lawyer induced by serious illness. The larger part of
the court's jurisdiction under this statute is invoked under 'excusable neglect'
where there is neither mistake of law or fact.")..
8 Ibid.8 Dunn v. Jones, 195 N. C. 354, 142 S. E. 320 (1928); Sikes v. Weatherly,
110 N. C. 131, 14 S. E. 511 (1892); see Garner v. Quakenbush, 187 N. C. 603,
606, 122 S. E. 474, 476 (1924).
"' Riskin v. Towers, 24 Cal. 2d 274, 148 P. 2d 611 (1944) ; Drinkard et al. v.
Spencer, 72 Colo. 396, 211 Pac. 379 (1922) ; Atwood v. Northern Pac. R. R., 37
Idaho 554, 217 Pac. 600 (1923); Savage v. Cannon, 204 S. C. 473, 30 S. E. 2d
70 (1944) ; Green v. McLoud Co., 87 Vt. 242, 88 Ad. 810 (1913).
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cusable.38 And the question of excusability is one of law and therefore
reviewable in every case.3 9 The leading case for this principle-is Norton
v. McLaurti 4° wherein the court outlined the rules governing applica-
tion of the statute. Upon entry of the motion to set aside, the judge
finds the facts on which it is based, and these findings are conclusive
on appeal when supported by the evidence. From such findings, he
determines whether excusable negligence has been shown. And from
this determination, either party may appeal. If he correctly determines
the negligence is not excusable, that puts an end to the motion. If he
correctly determines the negligence is excusable, then he may in the
exercise of his discretion grant or deny relief, and it is his ruling in this
particular that is reviewable only on a showing of abuse of discretion.
Hence, as might be expected, most of the cases in the reports have
turned on whether the legal ruling below was correct 4' rather than
whether the court had abused its discretion.4 2  The question of an abuse
of discretion thus becomes pertinent only43 where, as in the instant case,
the supreme court decides that the trial court in vacating the judgment
correctly held the negligence to be excusable.
DAVID M. McLLLAND.
Labor-Collective Bargaining Agreements-Union Liability
for Damages Under the Taft-Hartley Act
On June 23, 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act' made labor unions liable
in damages for the breach of collective bargaining agreements2 and for
injuries resulting from certain "unlawful" strikes and boycotts. 3 In
both types of cases the injured party is provided with unobstructed
M iManning v. Roanoke & T. R. R., 122 N. C. 824, 28 S. E. 963 (1898) ; Stith
v. Jones, 119 N. C. 428, 25 S. E. 1022 (1896); State Bank, Ltd. v. Post Falls
Land & Water Co., 29 Idaho 587, 161 Pac. 242 (1916). Movant must also show
that he has a meritorious defense. Craver v. Spaugh, 226 N. C. 450, 38 S. E. 2d
525 (1946).
"Marsh v. Griffin, 123 N. C. 660, 31 S. E. 840 (1898); Griel v. Vernon, 65
N. C. 76 (1871) ; FREEMAN, op. cit. supra, note 31, §290 ("This discretion relates
only to the question whether under the particular facts and circumstances dis-
closed the case is one which merits relief ... It has no relation to questions of
law which may arise upon the facts, but such questions must, of course, be deter-
mined and be subject to review the same as any other matter of law.").
40 125 N. C. 185, 34 S. E. 269 (1899).
"
1 Whitaker v. Raines, 226 N. C. 526, 39 S. E. 2d 266 (1946) ; Johnson v. Sid-
bury, 225 N. C. 208, 34 S. E. 2d 67 (1945); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v.
Turner, 202 N. C. 162, 162 S. E. 221 (1931); Sutherland'v. McLean, 199 N. C.
345, 154 S. E. 662 (1930) ; Warren v. Harvey, 92 N. C. 137 (1885).
"' Brown v. Hale, 93 N. C. 188 (1885); Kerchner v. Baker, 82 N. C. 169
(1880) ;'Bank of Statesville v. Foote et a1.,77 N. C. 131 (1877).
"No case has been found wherein the trial judge denied the motion to set
aside notwithstanding a legally correct ruling that movant's negligence was
excusable.
1
"Labor Management Act, 1947," 61 STAT. - , 29 U. S. C. A. §141 (Supp.
1947).2 Id. §185. 'Id. §187.
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